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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78A-3~i02(3)(a),
UTAH CODE ANN.

This Court granted the Petition for Certiorari on May 13, 2010.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Res judicata: Whether the claim asserted in the Complaint was

barred by res judicata.
Standard of Review:
When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, 'we review
the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial
court/ The court of appeals' determination of whether
res judicata bars an action presents a question of law.
'When reviewing questions of law, we accord no
particular deference to the conclusions of law made by
the court of appeals but review them for correctness/
Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214,
1218 (Utah 2000).

The decision of the Court of Appeals, on whether the Complaint was barred by
res judicata, was divided and this Court should make the law clear for future
litigants.
2.

Rule 11 Sanctions: Did the Complaint in the underlying action

violate Rule 11(b)(2), warranting sanctions.

1

Standard of Review: "[T]he standard of review for evaluating ... rule 11
sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: 'l) findings of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard; 2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the
correction of error standard; and 3) the type and amount of sanction to be
imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard/" Morse v. Packer
i5P.3d 1021,1025 (Utah 2000) (citing Barnard v. Sutlijf, 846 P.2d 1229,1234
(Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, et a/., 224 P.3d 741, 749 (Utah CtApp.
2010), regarding res judicata and Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions. (Gillmor at Kill, 8,10,
15-21, 28.) The Court of Appeals heard appeals from two final Orders issued by
the Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, in the Third Judicial District Court for
Summit County, Utah. One order granted a motion to dismiss (R. 154-156) by
Defendants/Appellees (collectively "Family Link") and the other granted a
motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (R. 195-205.)
The underlying case concerns a dispute over access to a very large parcel of
land (a few thousand acres) that is essentially landlocked. (R. 2 and 197; see also
Gillmor at H3.) As a result of a prior interpretation of a settlement agreement
between some persons related to the parties in this action, the parcel of property
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is accessible only to Gillmor personally (and a few others)1, and then only for very
limited purposes, including animal husbandry and hunting. Gillmor v. Macey,
2005 UT App 351,121 P.3d 57; see also Gillmor at H3. The road to the Gillmor
property, however, has been in use by the public as a thoroughfare continuously
for at least ten years (and actually closer to 100 years) for numerous purposes.
(R. 110, p. 241. 23 - p. 251. 21.)
b. Course of the proceedings: In this matter, Gillmor filed a Complaint
seeking private condemnation and/or "highway-by-use" over Family Links' lands.
(R. 1-7.) Family Link filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing judicial
estoppel and res judicata. (R. 22) Gillmor opposed the Motions to Dismiss,
arguing that her Complaint contained new claims, involved parties not included
in the previous actions, and on other grounds. (R. 70-77.) Family Link was also
granted Rule 11 Sanctions. (R. 111-112.)
c. Disposition at trial court: The District Court granted the Motion to
Dismiss only on the grounds of res judicata. (R. 109.)2 Following the Order

1 Gillmor's children from a prior marriage are ineligible to inherit the rights of
use because the lawyer for Frank Gillmor, an old sheepherder at the time, used
the word "consanguinity" in the Settlement Agreement to describe future rights.
2 Gillmor chose not to seek Rule 11 sanctions for Family Link's attempt to dismiss
based on judicial estoppel, even though the law on that point was crystal clear
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Granting the Motion to Dismiss (R. 154-156), Family Link was also granted Rule
11(b)(2) sanctions. (R. 195-205.)
d. Disposition in the Utah Court of Appeals: The Utah Court of Appeals, in
a split decision, upheld both orders by the District Court. (Gillmor at HH14,18
and 19.) The dissent, however, argued that res judicata did not apply and,
therefore, that Rule 11 sanctions could not have been awarded. (Gillmor at HH2528.) The majority decision of the Court of Appeals did not address how Rule 11
sanctions could be warranted given that the position of Gillmor's counsel - that
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata - was supported by a Judge
of the Court of Appeals.
RELEVANT FACTS
Gillmor owns a very large tract of property that is effectively landlocked as
a result of topography and a prior court ruling. See, Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT
App 351,121 P.3d 57; see also R. 2 and 197; see also Gillmor at H3). Family Link
owns lands that stand between Gillmor's property and the most convenient
presently declared public road. (R. 3; see also Gillmor at Uf 2 and 3.) Family Link
has been unwilling to allow Gillmor to have reasonable access to her property.
(R. 5, see also Gillmor at U4.) Gillmor brought this action to obtain reasonable
access to her property under two legal theories - "highway-by-use" (R. 5; see also

and Family Link had no legitimate basis for making the claim - as the District
Court found. (R. 229, p. 2611. 4-13).

A

Gillmor at HK4 and 24-27) (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2001)) and condemnation
(R. 4 and R. 229, p. 291. 20 - p. 301. 7; see also Gillmor at HH4 and 24-27). This
action was the first time that suit was brought that included as defendants all of
the property owners who block access from Gillmor's property to a road and this
Complaint was the first time that these two specific claims have been raised. (R.
1-7; see also Gillmor at UH24-27.)
In 1984 Gillmor's now-deceased husband, Frank Gillmor, brought an
action against only the largest landowner between Mr. Gillmor's property and the
main Weber Canyon Road, David K. Richards. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 2 and R. 110, p.
2911. 20-23; see also Gillmor at H2.) In that action Mr. Gillmor sought access to
his property either by a prescriptive easement or by an irrevocable license across
Mr. Richards' property. (Id.) That action ended over 20 years ago with a
settlement agreement between Mr. Richards and Mr. Gillmor providing for some
access to the Gillmor property across Mr. Richards' property. (Id.) As a
settlement, preclusion does not attach to the 1984 action or its resolution.
In 2001, Ms. Gillmor brought suit against Mr. Richards to determine and
enforce the terms of the 1984 settlement agreement so that she and others could
continue to access the Gillmor property. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 1; see also Gillmor at
U3.) The 2001 action ended when the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the
settlement agreement and left Gillmor's property essentially landlocked, limiting
access just to Mrs. Gillmor and a limited few others, and for very limited
purposes. (Id.) The Court of Appeals, interpreting the 1984 settlement
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agreement, specifically found that the easement created in the agreement did not
run with the land and would not inure to a future landowner, or even to Gillmor's
children who were non-consanguinous to Frank Gillmor. Gillmor v. Macey,
2005 UT App 351, UH19 and 23,121 P.3d 57; see also Gillmor at I3.
This action does not arise from the 1984 settlement agreement, or from the
2001 lawsuit to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement. Instead, the
issues in this case arise from and concern Gillmor's statutory rights. (R. 1-7; see
also Gillmor at 1^24-27.) Importantly, following resolution of the 2001 case,
"highway-by-use" law in Utah changed significantly.
This case is completely unlike the prior lawsuits. Gillmor does not here
seek a private easement over anyone else's property or any legal redress based on
the settlement agreement in her husband's 1984 case. Instead she brought new
statutory claims independent of the 1984 settlement agreement. (R. 1-7 and R.
229, p. 311. 4-6; see also Gillmor at 1f1f4 and 24-27.) Moreover, this action is
brought against all the landowners who block her property from declared public
roads, not just Mr. Richards and his successors-in-interest. (R. 1-7).
Family Link filed Motions to Dismiss under two theories, judicial estoppel
and res judicata. (R. 22; see also Gillmor at U4). The District Court rejected the
judicial estoppel argument but granted the Motion on the grounds of res
judicata. (R. 109; see also Gillmor at U7.) Thereafter, Family Link filed a Motion
for Rule 11 Sanctions that the District Court granted. (R. 195-205; see also
Gillmor at 118.)
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This case involves new parties and different claims than those previously
decided. (R. 1-7.) It is not barred by res judicata and sanctions should not have
been granted. Even if res judicata applied, sanctions are improper and
unwarranted because counsel had a reasonable basis for filing the Complaint, as
shown by, among other things, the fact that a Judge of the Court of Appeals also
believed that res judicata did not bar the Complaint.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata. The claims asserted in
the Complaint had not been brought in any prior action, depended on facts which
were not at issue in any prior action, involved statutory arguments completely
distinct from and independent of the claims in previous actions, and was the first
case to involve all of the landowners that block Gillmor's property access. (R. 17.) Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate in this case because Gillmor's counsel
filed the Complaint after researching the facts and the law and determining that
Gillmor's claims were warranted under existing law or at least were not contrary
to any existing Utah authority. Moreover, that a reasonable lawyer could advance
the claims is proven by the fact that one member of the Court of Appeals agreed
that Gillmor's claims were not barred by res judicata.
ARGUMENT
L

A. Res Judicata does not bar Gillmor's Complaint.

Res judicata does not apply in this case for, inter alia, the reasons clearly
and correctly articulated by Judge Thorne in his dissent below:

7

The suits initiated in 1984 and 2001 were private
claims, the first for a prescriptive easement or
irrevocable license and the second for a declaration of
rights under the easement agreement negotiated in the
previous case. These private claims are different than
and may be pursued separately from the public interest
claim

under

Utah

Code

Section

72-5-104

(the

Dedication Statute) as initiated in the present suit. See
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2009).
Although the public interest claim could have
been presented in either the 1984 or 2001 suit, I do not
believe that it should necessarily have been raised in the
previous actions for several reasons. First, neither Mr.
Gillmor in his IQ84 action nor Mrs. Gillmor in her 2001
action were obligated to bring a public claim - seeking a
right for the members of the public to use the Richards
property - in their pursuit of a determination of their
own private right to use of the property. Indeed, the
Gillmors' decision not to pursue a public claim under
the Dedication Statute ought not preclude any member
of the general public from initiating such a suit at a later
time.

The objective of claim preclusion is 'that a

8

controversy should be adjudicated only once/ see Mack
v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 4-. II29, 635
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation mark:

'tilled)

r

I 'his, ho w e < • ei , Is no I: feasible in the present case where

members of the public may still pursue a public claim
regardless of prior private right litigation.
Applica tion :)f clain 1 pi ech lsioi 1 in this 1 na titer
would lead to an illogical result. A literal application of
claim preclusion in the present case would have the
effect of preventing all members o» _u^_ 4^A;Jfv ^wni
bringing a ptiblic claim based on the res judicata ruling
barring the Gillmors from pursuing such a public claim.
Even it claim preclusion win1 applied oiih h I he
Gillmors, the majority's decision todaj

would be

illogical in that J" would prevent the Gillmors from
pursuing a claim which any other membei <>l llie public
1 i ligh t bring seeking the declaration of a public right in
this piece of property. Instead of ending a dispute about
the rights pertaining to a parcel the majority decision
simply delays the resolution for another day.
Second, the private claims asserted in the IQ84
and 2001 actions are inherently different and require
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the presence of different factual determinations than the
present public claim under the Dedication Statute
Gillmor at IU24-27 (emphasis added).
The 1984 action asserted a claim for prescriptive
easement.

To establish a prescriptive easement, a

claimant 'must establish a use that is open, notorious,
adverse, and continuous for at least twenty years.'
Edgell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, 18, 976 P.2d 1193. The
2001 action sought a declaration of rights under the
easement agreement negotiated in the previous case.
Neither of these two causes of action require, as does the
present claim, proof that the property has been
continuously

used

by

the

public

as

a

public

thoroughfare.

See Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding

Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, U10, 208 P.3d 1077, cert,
denied, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009). 'To satisfy the public
thoroughfare element, [pjlaintiffs must demonstrate
proof of (i) passing or travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii)
without permission.' Id. f 11.
Gillmor at n. 7 (emphasis in original).
Just because the claims are for access does not mean the claims are so
interrelated to those brought in previous suits that res judicata automatically or

10

nm^sni il\ applies. ,SVc Schuvv n. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983) andSearle
Bros. v. Searle, 558 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). Courts did not find res judicata
applicable in Schaer or Searle, even though all of the ac tions wei e aboi it access
anil UP,, o h e d tin 1 same parlic!!,

•

• •

Gillmor's case is surprisingly similar to the facts in Schaer v. State, 657
P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983). Schaer also involved multiple lawsuits and
property access In .SWitiri Ilia Nhile (if* 1 Itah condemned ( (» aires of Schaer's
22.8 acre property to build a highway in 1967. Schaer asked for and received
severance damages because the condemnation landlocked the remainder o; 11 > s
property .: . .

:.;-'•

-

•*

• > • « . : «,-. ^ .

n ,

w 'ill 1 1 xi across
More than a decade later Schaer instituted another suit seeking an access
road to the remainder of the proper! \ so lie could develop it (or residential use.
Tins Court found dial / es judicata did not bar his second case:
. . .because it is based on a different claim, demand or
cause of action than that of the i 967 litigation Thejwo
causes of action rest 00 a different state of facts and
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to
sustain the two causes of action.

Moreover, I he

evidence of I he I wo causes of arliori relates to the status
of the property in two completely different and separate
time periods.
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Id. (emphasis added).
This case too is based on a different state of facts than the prior action,
involves evidence of a different kind than was or would have been necessary in
either of the previous lawsuits, and is grounded in distinct legal theories. The
2001 case sought to interpret and enforce a private party contract. The instant
case seeks to apply statutory rights that are either public or quasi-public.
Consequently, Gilmore's claims, as in Schaer, are not barred by res
judicata since either a declaration of condemnation (R. 229, p. 2911. 21-24) or
"highway-by-use" (R. 229, p. 2311.13-18) to access the property require a
different state of facts and evidence then interpreting a private settlement
agreement between two parties.
TWIhere the second cause of action between the same
parties is upon a different cause or demand, the
principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly.
In this situation, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might
have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those
matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was
rendered/

Since the cause of action involved in the

second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in
the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which

12

wi iv nnl .a! ivjii in llie first proceeding, even though
such points might have been tendered and decided at
that time.
Commissioner n {iunnen< ;;;};$ 11.S y n , ',,4)7-98 (1948) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Gillmor is entitled to have a court determine
whether any member of the public can access this property \ i: 1 r n 1 M I e u m 11 i n u n 1
"highway-bv-11 s 1 " ( K. liini |» >; 111 | ;, I Inratisr t h.il is a different claim sounding
in different law than the mere interpretation of a settlement agreement.
Imposing res judicata in this situation would be contrary to establishes I Utah I 1 w :
the Court "resolve[sj all doubls in b u n <>(• i>rrmitluij.,) pari MV fu ha\e their day in
court nil the merits of a controversy". BYL u. Fremco, 2005 UT 19, H28 (citation
omitted), 110 P.3d 678. If there is any doubt whether res judicata exists here I he
doubt should be resolved in Gillmoi s favor and lliis dispute "-ilioitld lie remanded
to the histrii 1 Courl.

.

... .- . • -

Hill u. Seattle First Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) also supports
Gillmor's position. J^ • ... the parties were invols ed 111 aionlracl dispute A first
at hun a a . bhuii/lit imi 1 um ludi d in! federal court regarding the co ntract
between the parties and then a second action based on the same claims was
brought in state court.
Because 1
proceeding

never

piiui federal court
fully

explored

the

relationship between Hill-Magnum *"
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contractual
Seattle

collateral estoppel does not prevent Hill-Mangum from
relitigating the issue. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). * * *
After the federal court's decision, Hill-Mangum
brought the same claims against Seattle First in state
court, alleging, inter alia, that Seattle First... breach[ed]
an oral contract with Hill-Mangum.

Id. at 244

(emphasis added). * * *
We agree that the federal court ruling bars any
claim

Hill-Magnum

might base

on the

written

agreement. However, to the extent that the trial court
relied on collateral estoppel to bar an enquiry into the
rights created by an oral agreement, it erred. Id.
Both of the claims in Hill were based in contract yet this Court allowed the
second case to proceed as to the oral contract because the first case only resolved
the written contract. Similarly Gillmor should not be precluded from seeking
public access to her property against all landowners that block her access through
statutory claims that have never been brought or reached by any court. (R. 70-

ll\
B.

Res judicata is inapplicable in this case because there was a change

in the law.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is
no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has

14

been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation/'
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

I )uel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945)

(emphasis added).
There has been just such a change in the "highway-by-use"law, which
allows Gillmor to bring her Complaint. (R, nut), p, .|"7 I 10 • p. 481. 25) The
change in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for access U» her
propert^
reads

. ..

AM.I;.^

^

.-I

.

"[I]f the Court

^ ase trilogy that came down just a month or so ago from the

Supreme Court, it's clear that any Tom, Dick or Harry on the street has a riglil It
bring a road-by-use case." (K, :>LM, \K ,IU II in 1 J

Hits change in law precludes

a luidingo! n\(« iiidituna mi the l)ighway-by-usen claim in Gillmor's Complaint.
(R. 1-7). The change in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for
access to her property:
The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely
from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for
determining what qualifies as a sufficient inicmipiion
1o restart llic 1 iiiiniiij:1, ul' Ihc required ten-year period
under the Dedication Statute

MIO S*, i s< nv by setting

forth a bright-line Rule i»> wi,,i;.
J

I

. •, - e • -* c ••

.n predictable:

c dial io intended by a property owner !
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and
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is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute.
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT10, H15 (emphasis added), 179 P.3d 768.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals decision against Gillmor in the 2001 case
created just such an altered situation for Gillmor when it lessened the orivate
access she believed she had. Until the Court of Appeals' decision, Gillmor did not
have reason to believe that she and her children lacked meaningful access to the
property, or that she would need to establish the existence of a public right of
way. Therefore, res judicata does not bar her from bringing this Complaint. As
stated by Gillmor's counsel, "[Gillmor's] position in the 2001 case was for rights
about this big (demonstrating) and, when the Court of Appeals finished with it,
the rights were maybe a teeny, tiny sliver of what Ms. Gillmor was arguing for. At
that point, it's a pretty clear argument that the facts have ... materially changed."
(R. 110, p. 351. 23 - p. 361. 4).
In Gillmor's case both the facts and the law have changed. Therefore res
judicata should not have been applied because courts should be careful about the
preclusive effects of prior decisions, Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 142 P.3d 594, 598 (Utah
Ct. App. 2006), and this Court should remand the matter to the District Court
decide the claims in Gillmor's Complaint.
Condemnation is the other cause that Gillmor brings in the Complaint and,
contrary to Family Links* position, condemnation could not have been argued in

16

.... ,^ a j t e r n a i j, ( . { ,,, i in,, » ( i n | I, in,, | ( , i } \ ) |i ; ,,>i j,,,, /\ s noted by Gillmor's counsel,
"[t]he need for condemning a n access doesn't arise u n d e r the condemnation
statutes if you have access. That's a sine qua non of condemnation, 11 nil i ( is,
quote, necessary, dust 1 nu nil i

\K :>'M), p MI II ' i

,'|i

GilhiK >r lian 1 no need to seek condemnation when she thought she h a d
private access. However the interpretation of the 1984 agreement was
Gillmor, in fact, did not have

,

i*

,..

..-ton she

broughl -i piililn titiiii I o i t ondemnation, a claim that, in fact, any m e m b e r of the
public, that meets the applicable requirements, is entitled to bring pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

II.

§78B-6-50i(i)(e).

Sanctions should not have been awarded because Rule nfb)(2), UTAH. R

Civ, P., was not violated.
Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry »111 o 11 ni y: 11 i< I i f y
ofthea'iHHi pnor In lilmj.1, ,i I'ompl.nnl, whirl) (Jill run r's attorney did. (R. 110, p. 24
]!

9 a n d R. 229, p. 3211.12-19).
[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney ... is certifying
lliiil lo tin In ,1 nil ihi1 person 1 , hinvvliHii^t1, information,
and belief, formed after a n inquiry reasonable u n d e r t h e
circumstances, * * * (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contention.-* „„\hc\ wu

^ „ .-._ar 1 -ai 1 tea

existing law or hy a nonfrivolous argument for the
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extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law.
Rule 11, UTAH R. CIV. P. (emphasis added).
If a Judge on the Court of Appeals of Utah agrees with the position of
Gillmor's counsel, then how can that position be so unreasonable as to warrant
sanctions under Rule 11, UTAH. R. Crv. P? As Judge Thorne stated in his dissent:
Because I would reach a different conclusion on
the issue of res judicata than the majority, it follows
that Mrs. Gillmor's claim was asserted with a good faith
argument against res judicata see

UTAH.

R.

CIV.

P.

11(b)(2) (proving that rule 11 is violated when an
attorney fails to make a reasonable inquiry to assure
that 'the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law'), is
'objectively reasonable under all the circumstances,'
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992), and
should not result in rule 11(b) sanctions. Even if I am
wrong

and have erroneously

applied

the

claim

preclusion branch of res judicata, this is not enough to
support a rule 11 violation. See id. C[T]he mere fact that

18

tlir

.IIIMIKV*

* i*1^ ol Hi*' law was ""wrong cannot support

a finding of a rule 11 violation.') Accordingly, I would
reverse the district court's decision concerning
imposition of sanction.'-!
GiZ/i/mr at H28.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah below fails

J

thiskeypoint Is Judge J hoi UP \ ', irv. 'imvasuiMbh m, its faro? Surt'. not. ±a
such rhrumslances, sanctions under Rule n are not warranted.
Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated. First, Gillmor's claims have not been
brought in any other suit. Second, tlir claims am uairarttrtl by twisting law I h\
22<), p. ,$;> II. 1 10I, lunalls «(Jillint»r's claims are not "frivolous/'
"Frivolous filings are 'those that are both baseless and made without a
reasonable and competent inquiry.'" Estate of Blue o
F.3d982 ? i)Hit ojtli ("in on

. •

1 (< it.ition uimiftnil llclore bringing this case,

Gillmor's attorney did the research that Rule 11(b)(2) requires (See Gillmor at
I28):
[S]omt - !• -

-••,•-

. i^d iiuiice

pleading state, and I'm not going to tell you what the
record will show if we get , , past this motion Because I
knew .-•• •

* .

!;o

tin question,

when I filed the complaint, they sent a Rule 11 threat
letter. They graciously backed off the Rule 11 threat letter,
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.

but they made the motion nonetheless. And I understood
it, anticipated it. I anticipated the arguments that were
going to be made because they laid them out really clearly
before, and I anticipated in advance. When I first raised
this, there'd been a number of correspondence over the
course of a couple of years before we got to this lawsuit,
and we've had a full and frank discussion of these issues
in the past to the point where they suggested I read the
trial transcript in the last trial read every word of it, read
everything that you could read about it so we understood
what the case was about. (R. n o , p. 231.18 - p. 241. 24)
(emphasis added).
Gillmor's counsel, after conducting research, determined there were reasonable
basis to bring the claims, as in Barnard u. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah
1992). "Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The
appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all
of the circumstances." Barnard at 1236.
Just because Family Link and the District Court disagreed with Gillmor's
position does not mean that Gillmor's counsel violated Rule 11 or that Family Link is
entitled to sanctions. Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry
into the validity of the action. There is no finding that Gillmor's counsel failed to
investigate the claims asserted or that he failed to undertake appropriate legal

research prior I", l i l m g l l i e C o m p l a m l
because res judicata

Individ I h e D i s t o r t ("otirt d e t e r m i n e d t h a t

applied, t h a t s a n c t i o n s m u s t loli< »w. a n d the Court of Appeals

a g r e e d w i t h t h e District Court, Gillmor's attornnv In ucved tiuii *,.. . MJU( a n d a r e ) w a r r a n t , ii L>. * %; • •. -• 1

loLlni Hi 11

^> n* * ivton- wuMiot

< and k. 229, P- H2li. iii iy).

The Court of Appeals of IIIal) cites ^c/?o?7Ci/r ^frrro/ M,, hsiuL'S. I < . vo.j
P.2d 59 (Utah *
api

!•-•:••

!

\pp. i o o ^ as supp<
- *

•.-

•

-

* .. !* 'iiannMsiLe.

• *

Unlike in Shoney, (hlhnor and her counsel did not merely "file a nrv
Complaint containing the original claims . Shnneif a[
GiUmor's a t l o m e v researched

•

•

\ .->-a:

-nr^otVpar*.: uid determined that

Gillmor could assert claims on grounds independent • >1 eiain^ asserted in prior
litigation. (R. 229, p. 221 23 • p. 23 I. 22). Hie Complaint asserted on v factual
predicates lo the claims advanced, lach vvlm h were neither asserted nor entailed
1

i* -

:M)laint and were grounded in law

Mch was not involved in ^M\

prior complaint. That the District Court and .1 man>nf\ ol tne i..m,; 1.; .ppeais
iiliiuuiielydisagieed v\ .•

-ffinetii loin\ol''' Ktil'

"Rule 1 *'>-•>es not impose a duty to do perfect < w exhaustive research Tin
appropriate standard N whether the research was ubjectively reasonable A-M<
the circumstancesT ;w .-

,<>.

The I, j'^il Iheories in this case were iHo degrees
apart from tlie legal theories in the last case, completely

J\

and totally separate. The last case, the only one that Ms.
Gillmor could possibly have binding against her because
it's the only one she was the plaintiff in, in that case, she
was arguing only on a contract. There was no argument
about road-by-use ... I have a historian who spent thirty
thousand bucks just to show this road's use since 1848.
There is no question about good faith on the highway-byuse claim.... And that's a completely new theory. (R. 229,
p. 2311. 8 - 20).
As we're driving over the road, Your Honor, I
happened to notice, right next to the road sweetheart
trees. And 'C.S. + M. K. = True Love, 1958.' ... And the
statute says if it is used as a public road for a period often
years, continuously as a public thoroughfare, then it
becomes a public road and can only be closed by the local
government. (R. 229, p. 2611.12-23).
[T]he fact is that the legislature chose to determine
whether it's a public purpose or not, and they said it's a
public purpose ... a by-road leading from a highway or
residence and farms, which must by definition of
legislative construction, be something different than a
city/county road. (R. 229, p. 6111. 2-13).

Kven i( a dial n u n HUT I IIH is i haf ;i elami iy. not valid and subject to dismissal,
Rule n sanctions do not ineluctably follow: "[W]e cannot sa\ that [counsel's |
reading of the law, alone, supports the conclusion that nc ,

- ^- ,

is* nai>le

inqun\ linn die flaiins, defenses, ;mil nllier h%;il n)iile:;:;Mii& contained in the
complaint." Hessv.uuiut^L^iy ±btsP.^747

" r j (UtahCt. \\)\y 2 o o i . Rale 11 docs

not apply unless no reasonable attorney would nave asserts* ^. .au.^ .: .:.
tlu
ti

umplamt
..'i'; JI,! ::i•

*.. »vu-r\ .**--* .- »

-...--,

L

'hecidimsof

• - - >: M ••: < v * i^ the 2004 lawsuit As that lawsuit concerned contract

interpretation (which is what a dispute over a settlement involves) and dul not
concern public rights, as were asserted m lliis ('omnlaml, it is nii-i In lIiii.L 1li.il >u
reasonable lavn, er vvi xilil l»a\e filed I he Coi-pia±i±i.
Unlike in Pemiimjton IK Allstate Insurance O» 973 P 2d 932, 93Q Ll.-il •
1998), where the Court held that "pursuing an actsim:-M-=M;-U .. •
nm

V:«P*M- purpose",

1M!;:)I1 P.-

* .--.,r.. .,.>..*:.

a a n>e> to exceed the PIP cap is an

no Utah Court has held thai persuing an action that'~ later

he hinredby res judicata \> improper for the purpose ^

M

*:

CONCLUSION
Gillmor's action was not barred by res iitdwtita and Rule* 11( b II:' I", 11 IAH
'; was no 1

iitted and saint lions should no! have been awarded. The

^ .,. >. - M it- t of Utah should adopt the decision t »f the dissent ol the Utah Court
of Appeals, and return the case to the District Cour t for further proceedings on
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the substance a I Hil1". "" '' mipl.iml,
DATKI) this

/ .? ' ^ day of July, 2010.

Bruce B. Baird
Attorneys for Appellant

24

CERTIIN ATI OF SERVICE
The undersigned herein certifies that on the . . / > < . .
true and correct copies oi im luicgoii^iiiu!'
mail, postal

...

H'1-

> >ach of the following:

Keith W.Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGA J.
257 East 200 South, Ste. ^00
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Elizhbctii x. Dunning
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Main, Ste. 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84 m
Edwin C. Barnes
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center i:Vh Fl
201 South Main St
/">
Salt Lake Cit>. I T H4111

25

:

.i
' s-:"'' ^••- served by

)

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 0 2010

ADDENDUM
l. Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals

II

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Family Link, LLC, a Utah
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individual and as trustee;
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Third District, Silver Summit Department, 070500385
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder
Attorneys: Bruce R. Baird and Dallis A. Nordstrom, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee
Keith W. Meade, Elizabeth T. Dunning, and Edwin C,
Barnes, Salt Lake City, for Appellees and Crossappellants

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Greenwood.1
BENCH, Senior Judge:
Ifl Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor (Mrs. Gillmor) appeals the district
court's dismissal of her claims on res judicata grounds and
imposition of sanctions against her attorney under rule 11(b)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for filing a claim without
basis in law. Defendants cross-appeal the district court's
1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela T. Greenwood heard and
voted on this case as regular members of the Utah Court of
Appeals. They both retired from the court on January 1, 2010,
before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated herein
as Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103(2) (2008); Sup.
Ct. R. of Prof'l Practice 11-201(6).

denial of sanctions under rule
improp° r purpose
W^ a f f irm.z

i

BACKGROUND
f2
In 1984, Mrs. Gillmor's :IL,M^:JU. U . H U . C : . . ai^. o(Mr. Gillmor) f brought suit against David K. Richards. M± *
Gillmor sought a prescriptive easement or irrevocable license in
an attempt to access h is property (the Gillmor property) by way
of two private roads, which run from a nearby highway and through
Richards's property (the Richards property). The parties settled
the 1984 suit by entering into an Easement and Use Agreement (the
easement agreement). Following the settlement, upon the parties'
joint stipulation, the district court dismissed with preiudiee
the 19 84 suit on the merits,
113
In 2001,- Mrs. Gillmor filed suit against the subsequent
owners of the Richards property, seeking a declaration of her
rights under the easement agreement.3 Specifically, the 2001
suit concerned the authorized use of the roads to access the
Gillmor property under the easement agreement. The district
court's decision was appealed, and in Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT
App 351, 121 P.3d 57, this court concluded that the easement
agreement grants a personal easement to a limited class of
people, including Mrs. Gillmor. See id. 4 * 15-2 3. We expressly
held that Mrs. Gillmor's personal right to access the Gillmor
property through the Richards property does not expand the rights
of any other person to use the easements or the purposes for
which the easements may be used beyond what is expressly
authorized by the easement agreement. See id. iff 14, 23, <
Further, this court concluded that those uses expressly
authorized by the easement agreement, which would run with the
property, were limited to very narrow and specific purposes. See
xu. ft 24-31. Consequently, use of the easements for purposes
other than Mrs. Gillmor's own access was severely I imi ted by the
easement agreement. See id. Iff 14, 23, 43.

oecdus'-: we ^o:u::-ide that Mrs. Gilliiioi ' s claims are barred by
res judicata, we i :ot address Defendants' alternative argument
that her c.^-mr a^ .-; 1 .so barred by indicia" p^-nnoe],
3. Following the 1995 passing of Mr. Gillmor, Mrs. Gillmor
became the owner of the Gillmor property. After the 1984 sui t,
the Richards property was partitioned and sold to other persons
who were named as parties in the 2 001 suit and the present suit.
For the reader's convenience, we refer to these parcel s
col ] ectively as the Richards property.

20080757-CA
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114 In 2007, Mrs. Gillmor filed the present suit against
Defendants, owners of the Richards property, pleading
condemnation and "highway-by-public-use." See generally Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2009) (permitting a highway to be dedicated
to public use when "continuously used as a public thoroughfare
for a period of ten years"). Like the 1984 and 2001 suits, this
suit concerns use of the roads over the Richards property to
access the Gillmor property. But this time a public right has
been asserted, rather than a private right arising out of
contract or property ownership. Defendants moved the district
court to dismiss, arguing that Mrs. Gillmor's claims are barred
by res judicata.
%5 Before the district court, both parties' arguments focused
solely on whether, under the claim preclusion branch of res
judicata, Mrs. Gillmor's claims could and should have been
brought in either of the two prior suits. Mrs. Gillmor*s
attorney, Bruce R. Baird, asserted that Mrs. Gillmor's claims
were subject to "narrow exceptions" to res judicata, arguing that
"'there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must give
way to . . . overriding concerns of public policy and simple
justice.'" (Quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 402-03 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (responding by
separate concurrence to the lead opinion's rejection of an
equitable exception to res judicata, see id. at 401, arguing that
the majority should not "close the door" to such an exception).)
Mr. Baird did not cite to any specific examples of exceptions to
res judicata. Rather, Mr. Baird argued that Mrs. Gillmor should
be permitted to pursue these legal theories, regardless of the
two prior suits, because the theories alleged are public rights
that can "be brought by other members of the public." Mr. Baird
supported his argument only by referencing the policies behind
res judicata, arguing that these policies would not be
compromised by allowing Mrs. Gillmor to pursue her present suit
because "the claims brought by [Mrs. Gillmor] are claims which
can be brought by other members of the public . . . so judicial
economy and multiple law suits should not be implicated simply
because of the identity of the Plaintiff." To emphasize his
point that any member of the public could allege these legal
theories, Mr. Baird stated, "[I]f the Court dismisses [Mrs.
Gillmor's claims,] I'll bring [the same causes of action] in
somebody else's name."
If6 Mr. Baird conceded that the legal theories alleged here
could have been brought in either the 1984 or 2001 suits, as they
were legally and factually available at those times. Mr. Baird
also speculated that these theories were omitted from earlier
suits for strategic purposes, stating that simultaneously
bringing a claim for a public and private right of access "would
have been pretty dicey."
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11 / Following oral argument, the district cour t i uled £i om the
bench that Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res judicata.
The district court relied upon the preclusive effect of both the
1984 and 2001 suits. The district court found that the legal
theories presented had been "legally and factually available for
many decades" and reasoned that the three suits involved the same
claim because each was motivated by a common goal—access to the
Gillmor property. Accordingly, the district
court concluded
that
these claims could and should have been presented in the prior
suits. The district court also stated, without objection from
either party. "There's no question about any of the other prongs
of claim preclusion applying here."
K8
Deferiucs..^. ;.:ie: ,<-vt-w ror sanctions under rule 11(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court imposed rule
11(b)(2) sanctions against Mr. Baird for filing a claim without
basis in law because Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res
judicata. However, the district court declined to impose
sanctions under rule 11(b)(1) for filing a claim with an improper
purpose, finding no evidence that either Mrs. Gillmor or Mr,
Baird acted with an i mproper purpose. Mrs. Gillmor appeals, nicl
Defendants cross-appeal.
ISSUES ANU STANUAKDI-I c,,i. HFV1FW
Mrs. Gillmor first appeals the district court's
determination that her claims are barred by the claim preclusion
branch of res judicata. "Whether res judicata, and more
specifical] y claim preclusion, bars an action presents a question
of law that we review for correctness." Mack v. Utah State Dep't
of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, II 26, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
110 Mrs. Gillmor also appeals the district court's decision to
impose sanctions against her attorney, Mr. Baird, under rule
11(b)(2) for filing a claim without basis in law. Defendants
cross-appeal the district court's decision not to impose
sanctions against both Mrs. Gillmor and Mr. Baird under rule
11(b)(1) for filing a claim with an improper purpose. "In
reviewing a trial court's imposition of [rule 11] sanctions,
we first review the trial court's factual findings under
the clearly erroneous' standard. We then review the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Finally, we review
the type and amount of sanctions imposed under the abuse of
discretion standard." Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d
932, 936-37 (Utah 1998) (quoting Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d
1229, 1234-35 (Utah 1992)). The decision of whether to actually
impose sanctions is ultimately within the district court's
discretion. See Utah R. Civ."P. 11(c) ("If . . . the court
determines that subd i vision (b) has been violated, the court

0 0B0 7S 7- \'f\
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may . . . impose an appropriate sanction . . . ." (emphasis
added)); Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, H 34, 20 P.3d
307 ("[I]t remains within the court's discretion to apply
sanctions under rule 11(c) even if it finds a violation of rule
11(b) . . . . " ) .
Decisions regarding rule 11 sanctions
are best left in the hands of the trial
court. We therefore accord reasonable
discretion to the trial court to determine
when sanctions are useful and appropriate.
When applying the appropriate standards of
review, we grant considerable deference to
the trial court's factual findings and some
deference to the trial court's application of
the facts when reaching its legal conclusion
of whether rule 11 has been violated. We
also afford substantial deference to the
trial court's ultimate determination of when,
and to what extent, sanctions are a useful
tool in controlling abuses of the judicial
process.
Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, f 7, 197 P.3d 650.
ANALYSIS
I.

Res Judicata

IF 11 Mrs. Gillmor first argues that the district court
erroneously concluded that her claims are barred by the claim
preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion is premised
on the principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only
once," Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f 29,
635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation marks omitted), and
"reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity
to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so,"
American Estate Mqmt. Corp. v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp.,
1999 UT App 232, U 12, 986 P.2d 765 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Whether claim preclusion bars the relitigation of
certain claims depends upon full satisfaction of a three-part
test:
First, both cases must involve the same
parties or their privies. Second, the claim
that is alleged to be barred must have been
presented in the first suit or be one that
could and should have been raised in the
first action. Third, the first suit must
have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
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Mack, 2009 UT 47, 11 29 (internal quotation marKs omitted)
Because the parties below contested only the second prong of
claim preclusion, our analysis will focus on whether the claims
at issue in this case could and should have been brought in
either the 1984 or 2001 suits.4
H12 "A claim or cause of action io ,.^ aggregate of operative
facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts,"
Id. 11 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Claims or causes
of action are the same as those brought or that could have been
brought in the first action if they arise from the same operati ve
facts, or jr. other words from the same transaction." Id^
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) j T ~ "What
factual grouping constitutes a "transaction,1 . . . [is] to
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations
as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation[ and] whether they form a convenient trial unit

•1 neither party has ever contested that both the !9o4 -. no <
suits resulted in a final judgment on the merits. And be^ow,
neither party challenged whether the parties here are either T ae
same parties as o r are in privity w i t h t h e parties from the r--p r i o r suits. A t oral argument before this c o u r t , M r . Baird
asserted for the first time that M r s . Gillmor is not in privi -y
w i t h h e r husband, Mr Gillmor. Because this argument wa:% noproper ly preserved, w e will n o t address it. S e e Utah R. A p p . P.
24(a)(5)(A) (requiring a party to show that t h e issue being
appealed was preserved in t h e trial oou-*!.); Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal C o . , 966 P.2d 8 4 4 , 847 (Utah 1998) (explaining preservation
requirement and stating that n [ i ] s s u e s not raised at trial are
usually deemed w a i v e d " ) ; State v. M a r b l e , 2 007 U T A p p 8 2 , If 1 9 ,
". • ' t . 3d ?•"! {decline:; to review o- appea"- an I ssue rai sed for
t i} e f . r st
r • *- * *
»r~ n" ime n t) ,
In Mack v. Utah State Department of C o m m e r c e , 2 009 UT 4 7, 635
U t a h Adv. Rep. 7 9 , t h e Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted t h e
transactional theory as articulated in the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 24 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , concerning the same claim elemerr -•£
claim preclusion:
Previously w e have held that t w o causes of
action are t h e same if they rest o n t h e same
'state of facts,' and the evidence 'necessary
to sustain the t w o causes of action' is of
the same kind or character. Schaer v . State,
657 P. 2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . More
recently, however, w e have moved toward the
trans actiona1 theory o^ ^"aim preclus A on
i
spoused by nh^ Restatement , "ero: d
1U.

<~^A
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. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2). See
generally id. § 24 cmt. b (explaining what constitutes a
transaction). Accordingly, "res judicata . . . turn[s] on the
essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the
various legal claims," Mack, 2009 UT 47, If 30 (internal
quotation marks omitted), or a common motivation behind those
claims, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2), "[r]ather
than resting on the specific legal theory invoked," Mack, 2009 UT
47, 1 30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Defining the scope of a claim or cause of action is
not an exact science and, in fact, is at times driven by the
relative importance of the finality of judgment. When, as in
this case, . . . real property is at issue, the need for finality
is at its apex." American, 1999 UT App 232, 11 10 (citations
omitted).
113 Although Mrs. Gillmor has alleged different legal theories
in the present suit, we conclude that these theories "could and
should have been raised" in either the 1984 or 2001 suits. See
Mack, 2009 UT 47, 1f 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). All
three suits have had an identical motivation calculated to obtain
a common goal: use of roads over the Richards property in order
to more easily access the Gillmor property. Therefore, each suit
has asserted the same claim. Further, Mrs. Gillmor has conceded
that the legal theories at issue here were legally and factually
available before the 1984 suit and, therefore, could have been
pleaded in either of the two prior suits.
1114 It appears that a claim based on public rights may have been
intentionally ignored or strategically sacrificed in favor of
asserting a private right. When the district court inquired why
Mrs. Gillmor had not asserted public rights before, Mr. Baird
speculated that omitting these theories may have been a strategic
decision, stating that simultaneously asserting a public and
private right to access "would have been pretty dicey." The
district court then characterized Mrs. Gillmor's present suit as
being a last resort to gain access in response to the less-thanfavorable result of the 2001 suit: "[Mrs. Gillmor] argues that
her present legal causes of action were utterly unnecessary until
the Court of Appeals ruled against her, but that argument only
suggests that litigation choices were made, as they should be,
and not every possible theory was advanced." Further, the record
indicates that the Gillmors sought a private right to access the
Gillmor property over the Richards property, to the exclusion of
a public thoroughfare, and that Mrs. Gillmor would prefer that
the roads remain private. This is not only a strategic decision
on how to present the claim, but it is also a choice as to the
desired objective of the litigation. Whether "purposely or
negligently," the Gillmors failed to assert all available
theories supporting their claim "by all proper means within
[their] control." See American, 1999 UT App 232, 11 12 (internal
quotation marks omitted). They cannot "be permitted to . . .
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relitigate the same matters betwet
ue same ^cu-L^e^," See id.
(internal quotation marks omitted)
Nor may they now "pursue
their claim , , . through piecemeal litigation, [having offered]
one legal theory to the courr while holding others in reserve for
future litigation," which are now being asserted because the
first two suits have "prove Fn; unsuccessful." See id. 1" 14.
Mrs. Gillmor cannot now be allowed yet anotner "attempt at
substantially the same objective undei a different guise." See
Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 4T>, 376 P.2d 946, 948 (1962). —
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Mrs.
Gi ] lmor's c] a ims are barred by res judicata.

1115 Both parties challenge the district t;ou:t j decision
concerning the imposition of ra^M.ons. Pj ' •" * 1 ' b ) states in
pertinent part,
(b) By presenting a pleading, writte:. mo-:on,
or other paper to the court (whether ny
signing, filing, submitting, or advocati:.\\ ,<
an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying that to the best of the person .::
knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry re^^nah"^ \ mder the
circumstances,
^2) it is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless i ncrease
i n the cost of ] itigati on; [and]
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
mod ification, or reversal of existing 3 aw or
the estab] i shment of new law[,]
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)~(2). Each subpar t of i ule l^i.)
provides a separate basis for sanctionable conduct that must be
independently met. See id. R. 11(c); Crank v. Utah Judicial
Council, 2001 UT 8, 11 33, 20 P. 3d 307. We emphasize that
" [d]ecisions regarding rule l j. ^unctions are best left in the
hands of the trial court. !" Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76,
1" 7, 197 P. 3d 650. We therefore "afford substantial deference to
the trial court's ultimate determination of when, and to what
extent, sanctions are a usefi i] tool i n controlling abuses of the
j udic i a 1 process." ' cL_
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A.

Rule 11(b)(2)

1116 Mrs. Gillmor argues that the district court improperly
imposed sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by filing a claim that is
not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
[a change in] . . . existing law." See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
See generally id. R. 11(c)(2)(A) (stating that although sanctions
may be imposed against attorneys or parties, sanctions may not be
imposed against a represented party for violation of subsection
11(b)(2)). Whether a claim is warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the change in existing law is not
determined by whether the argument is the correct legal position
but by whether it is "objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah
1992). Here, the district court's determination that Mr. Baird
had violated rule 11(b)(2) was premised upon the court's
conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res
judicata. See generally Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863
P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's
imposition of rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff who attempted
to relitigate identical claims that were clearly barred by res
judicata). In view of our conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's claims
are barred by res judicata, the appropriate standard of review is
whether the district court's decision to impose sanctions was an
abuse of its discretion. See Archuleta, 2008 UT 76, If 7.
1117 The district court began its rule 11(b)(2) analysis by
concluding that Mrs. Gillmor!s claims were barred by res
judicata: neither party had contested the privity and finality
elements; and the present suit involved the same claim as the
1984 and 2001 suits because each suit claimed access to the
Gillmor property based on facts and legal theories that had been
available at those times. The district court wrote that it was
"at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the
present action without violating [r]ule 11(b)(2) [because] once
the three elements [of res judicata] are satisfied, [it was]
unaware of any exceptions to application of the bar imposed by
res judicata, and plaintiff has not identified any such
exception." (Emphasis added.)
1118 The district court's finding that Mr. Baird did not present
any legal authority in support of the purported exceptions to res
judicata is particularly persuasive. Mr. Baird argues that "the
mere fact that [his] view of the law was wrong cannot support a
finding of a rule 11 violation." See generally Barnard, 846 P.2d
at 1236. However, it is not that Mr. Baird's arguments below
were wrong but that those arguments were not supported by any
legal authority—especially given the fact that Mr. Baird had
anticipated the res judicata issue before filing this suit. In
light of the filing of a claim barred by res judicata and the
absence of any legal authority in support of Mr. Baird's
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arguments below concerning exceptions to res judicata, we cannot
say that the district court abused its considerable discretion in
imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2).
B.

Rule 11(b)(1)

If 19 Defendants argue on cross-appeal that the district court
improperly denied their motion for sanctions against both Mrs.
Gillmor and Mr. Baird under rule 11(b)(1) for filing a claim with
an improper purpose. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). See
generally id. R. 11(c) (allowing sanctions to be imposed against
attorneys and parties). Whether a party acted with an improper
purpose is a question of fact, reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (characterizing a party's purpose under
rule 11(b)(1) as an issue of intent, which is a question of fact
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard); Edwards v. Powder
Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 1F 25, 214 P.3d 120 ("We
must uphold a trial court's factual findings regarding whether
rule 11 has been violated unless the evidence clearly weighs
against such findings."). "A factual finding is deemed clearly
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the
evidence," and "we will not overturn a trial court's factual
findings if its account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety." Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937
(internal quotation marks omitted).
H20 In denying Defendants' request to impose sanctions against
Mrs. Gillmor and Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(1), the
district court wrote that it could "see no evidence of a purpose
to harass, delay, . . . impose unnecessary cost[,] . . . or
needlessly increase the costs of litigation." Rather, the
district court stated that Mrs. Gillmor's purpose was clear: "to
obtain access that has not been obtained through previously
advanced theories." After reviewing the record, we cannot say
that the district court's findings are against the clear weight
of the evidence. We, therefore, will not disturb the district
court's decision not to impose sanctions against Mrs. Gillmor and
Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(1).
CONCLUSION
1f21 The district court correctly concluded that Mrs. Gillmor's
claims are barred by res judicata. All three suits brought by
the Gillmors have asserted the same claim: use of the roads over
the Richards property to more easily access the Gillmor property.
And the theories alleged here were legally and factually
available when the first suit was filed. Therefore, these
theories could and should have been raised in one of the prior
suits. The district court acted within its discretion in
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imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2)
and denying sanctions under rule 11(b)(1).
1122 Accordingly, we affirm.6

Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge

1123

I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge

THORNE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
H24 I concur in the general statement of the law of res judicata
and rule 11 sanctions as set out in the majority opinion but
dissent from application thereof to the instant case. I disagree
with the majority's conclusion that each of the three actions
asserted sufficiently similar claims, see supra 11 13, and, that,
therefore, the third action is barred by the claim preclusion
branch of res judicata. The suits initiated in 1984 and 2001
were private claims, the first for a prescriptive easement or
irrevocable license and the second for a declaration of rights
under the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case.
These private claims are different than and may be pursued
separately from the public interest claim under Utah Code section
72-5-104 (the Dedication Statute) as initiated in the present
suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2009).
1125 Although the public interest claim could have been presented
in either the 1984 or 2001 suit, I do not believe that it should
necessarily have been raised in the previous actions for several
reasons. First, neither Mr. Gillmor in his 1984 action nor Mrs.
Gillmor in her 2001 action were obligated to bring a public
claim—seeking a right for the members of the public to use the

6. We do not address Defendants' request for attorney fees under
rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because it was
inadequately briefed. See generally Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 313 ("[A]n appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.").
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Richards property—in their pursuit of a determination of their
own private right to use of the property. Indeed, the Gillmors'
decision not to pursue a public claim under the Dedication
Statute ought not preclude any member of the general public from
initiating such a suit at a later time. The objective of claim
preclusion is "that a controversy should be adjudicated only
once/' see Mack v. Utah State^Pep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47,
11 29, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This, however, is not feasible in the present case where members
of the public may still pursue a public claim regardless of prior
private right litigation.
12 6 Application of claim preclusion to this matter would lead to
an illogical result. A literal application of claim preclusion
in the present case would have the effect of preventing all
members of the public from bringing a public claim based on the
res judicata ruling barring the Gillmors from pursuing such a
public claim. Even if claim preclusion were applied only to the
Gillmors, the majority's decision today would be illogical in
that it would prevent the Gillmors from pursuing a claim which
any other member of the public might bring seeking the
declaration of a public right in this piece of property. Instead
of ending a dispute about the rights pertaining to a parcel, the
majority decision simply delays the resolution for another day.
1127 Second, the private claims asserted in the 1984 and 2001
actions are inherently different and require the presence of
different factual determinations than the present public claim
under the Dedication Statute.7 As such, I would reverse the
district court's dismissal of Mrs. Gillmor's public claim on res
judicata grounds.
t28 Because I would reach a different conclusion on the issue of
res judicata than the majority, it follows that Mrs. Gillmor's
claim was asserted with a good faith argument against res
judicata, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (providing that rule 11 is
7. The 1984 action asserted a claim for prescriptive easement.
To establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant "must establish
a use that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for at
least twenty years." Edqell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, It 8, 976
P. 2d 1193. The 2001 action sought a declaration of rights under
the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. Neither
of these two causes of action require, as does the present claim,
proof
that the property has been continuously used by the public
as a
public thoroughfare. See Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding
Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, H 10, 208 P.3d 1077, cert, denied,
215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009). "To satisfy the public thoroughfare
element, [p]laintiffs must demonstrate proof of (i) passing or
travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii) without permission." Id.
It 11.
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violated when an attorney fails to make a reasonable inquiry to
assure that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law"), is "objectively reasonable under all
the circumstances," Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah
1992), and should not result in rule 11(b) sanctions. Even if I
am wrong and have erroneously applied the claim preclusion branch
of res judicata, this is not enough to support a rule 11
violation. See id. ("[T]he mere fact that the attorney's view of
the law was wrong cannot support a finding of a rule 11
violation."). Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's
decision concerning the imposition of sanctions.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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